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We Need to Talk About the Cultural Commons: Some 
Musings on Rhizomatic Jurisprudence and Access to Art
Merima Bruncevic 1
This article analyses the possibility of constructing a legal concept of the cultural 
commons in order to facilitate access to art. The concept of the cultural commons 
is here connected to the Swedish legal principle “allemansrätten”. It is argued that 
in order to imagine and construct such a concept, legal reasoning must reach 
beyond certain opposite based dichotomies particularly public-private and open-
closed. These dichotomies can be found in for instance intellectual property law. 
The article argues that a legal cultural commons can be envisioned by applying the 
rhizome theory developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The notion of the 
cultural commons is placed within the Deleuzeoguattarian forms of possession. 
Keywords: Cultural Commons – Access to art – Gilles Deleuze – Félix Guattari – 
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That the Rosetta Stone is probably one of the most important items of cultural heritage 
for our civilisation is an undisputed fact. Dating back to 196 B.C. it has provided scholars 
with a key to reading Egyptian hieroglyphs, which in turn has opened up for a wealth of 
knowledge in terms of the ancient world, as well as to understanding our own society and 
its past and current structures. 
In the year of 2013 the British Museum, the establishment that currently houses the 
Rosetta Stone among thousands of other pieces of cultural heritage, attracted 6,8m 
visitors. 2 The museum generated in that same year around £67m in income. The tourism 
body Visit Britain has approximated that Britain’s major museums and galleries, including 
1 M. Bruncevic, LLD: Department of Law, Gothenburg University, Vasagatan 1, Box 650, 405 30 
Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: merima.bruncevic@law.gu.se
2 Since 2003 Egypt has been requesting the repatriation of the Rosetta Stone, claiming that 
it is part of Egypt’s cultural heritage and serves as an “icon of Egyptian identity” and must 
therefore be returned to Egypt, its source country. The British Museum, together with some 
other internationally leading museums, have generally and as a matter of principle claimed 
that certain cultural heritage items like the Rosetta Stone, on the contrary are now part of 
our common global identity and as such these items can be attributed to the human kind as 
a whole. The museums have even issued a joint statement claiming that “objects acquired 
in earlier times must be viewed in the light of different sensitivities and values reflective of 
that earlier era” and that “museums serve not just the citizens of one nation but the peo-
ple of every nation”. See e.g., Bailey (2003).This article will not directly address the issue of 
ownership, and to whom these items of cultural heritage belong. This article addresses the 
access issue, i.e. how making items of cultural heritage open to public access through a legal 
concept of the cultural commons does not equate depreciation or loss in value in terms of 
the underlying resource and/or ownership rights connected to it.
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the British Museum, earn the UK £1bn a year in revenue from overseas tourists only. This 
can be compared to the profit that Volvo made in the second quarter of the year 2013, 
which came in at around £35m. A new Volvo car costs around £30k. A visit to the British 
Museum is free of charge. In fact, for the last 225 years the British Museum has adhered 
to the principles of free public access. How is it possible that it can have a comparable 
turnover to Volvo while remaining free of charge to the general public? It will be proposed 
here that a simple answer to that question is that while Volvo is structured like a private 
company, the British Museum is structured and governed like a cultural commons. 
As part of the 2014 election campaign a Swedish political party released posters where the 
political ”slogans” were only made up of excerpts from pop songs such as Beyoncé’s Who 
Run the World (Girls) [sic] and Dolly Parton’s Working Nine to Five. The copyright holders 
were quick to protest – the right to use the lyrics in this context had not been cleared, 
they claimed. This use of their works was not fair use and it constituted infringement 
of copyrights, they claimed further. The copyright holders had not in any way agreed 
to be associated with any one political party. A number of Swedish intellectual property 
scholars were asked to comment on this issue, and they stated without any hesitation, that 
activities like this are typical cases of infringement of copyright laws. The political party 
in question retracted, and withdrew the posters.
The intellectual property scholars were probably right in asserting that this was not fair 
use and that the posters therefore constituted infringing use. However, it can be argued 
that this occurrence could have perhaps been the perfect opportunity to re-instigate the 
discussion concerning the scope of fair use when it comes to utilisation of copyright 
protected works within the contexts of freedom of expression, such as in connection with 
political utterances. This could have also been the golden opportunity to discuss what 
constitutes copyright protected works and in turn what constitutes the unrestricted free 
expression now, in the globalised, media saturated, branded, knowledge society. Perhaps it 
could have been in order for someone to raise the argument that the world is in constant 
change, and so is our way of communicating, and as such the legal constructions of closed 
copyrights versus open free expressions as a dichotomy needs to be addressed. Today, as 
part of our everyday communications, we constantly make references to songs, brands, 
popular culture, current events – it has become part of our daily language. Our multi-
media, connected, network based existence is loaded with copyright protected works and 
trademarks that have worked their way into our patterns of communication. We say 
that we ”google” when referring to conducting searches on the internet, regardless of 
which search engine we are using, we ”facebook”, we ”tweet”, we ”xerox” and so on. We 
do all this, fully oblivious to the fact that we are in fact using (and diluting!) copyright 
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protected works and trademarks, that we are engaging with the fair use and public domain 
principles, and all other activities permitted and not permitted through the constructions 
of intellectual property laws. It could have therefore, perhaps, been warranted to at least 
ponder the argument that this is how we communicate, by referencing content, by re-
locating and re-using, repurposing, each other’s expressions. It could have been argued 
that this is the very language of the digital media knowledge society, it has become part 
of our language and it has become our way of interacting with each other, of expressing 
ourselves. So when the political party retracted and withdrew their posters it could have, 
perhaps, been argued that the freedom of expression was limited a little by claiming that 
this was infringing activity, full stop. Perhaps, at least a (rhetorical) question would have 
been in order, to ask, whether this potentially also could mean a restriction on freedom 
of expression. 
Often, private ownership laws such as intellectual property laws are pitted against issues 
of access or freedom of expression, very much like in the two instances described above. 
The one has to benefit at the cost of the other. It has now come a time when we need to 
talk about a legal field where these two interests can converge into an alliance: within the 
scope of a legal cultural commons. 
This article analyses the possibility of constructing a legal concept of the cultural 
commons. Such a concept can and will be connected to the Scandinavian legal principle 
“allemansrätten” below. It will be argued that in order to imagine and construct a legal 
cultural commons, we must reach beyond certain (stifling? false?) dichotomies, such as 
public-private, and allow for a reasoning that is open to multi-layered, constellation-
based legal concepts. An attempt to do just that will be done below by applying the 
rhizome theory developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 
The commons and “allemansrätten”
When we talk about “the commons” what is most often discussed, at least in legal studies, 
are the natural commons and access to it (e.g. Valguarnera 2013a, see also Valguarnera 
2013b) - i.e. access to open fields, wide landscapes, green pastures, lakes, rivers... One 
may also be referring to the resources tied to this category of commons such as irrigation 
water, clean and fresh air, fisheries or berries. The commons, it is often assumed, has to do 
with distribution and allocation of (natural) recourses. It can also be a question of access 
to nature and land that might be owned by some, and that may, under limited forms be 
accessed by the wider public (Hyde 2012). In connection to the right to access nature, 
the Scandinavian customary legal principle, which can be described as a right to roam, 
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called “allemansrätten” 3 has been developed. 4 Allemansrätten has for a long time been 
acknowledged as a bona fide legal principle by for instance the Swedish Supreme Court 
(Högsta Domstolen) and is today also inscribed in the Swedish constitutional law 5 and in 
the Swedish Environmental Code (Miljöbalken). 6 In broad terms, the principle grants 
the public a right to access and roam in nature, which means, generally speaking, that 
everybody may, for a limited time and on certain terms and conditions, 7 dwell in nature, 
hike, camp, swim in lakes, pick berries, and so on. 
The right to roam in and access nature has in Scandinavia traditionally been considered 
to be of particular significance since it is directly connected to the public health and 
wellbeing. The wellness produced by continuous and frequent access to nature ought 
to be, it is argued, secured and safeguarded. This wellness that access to nature gives rise 
to has thus been given a legal status and transformed into a public right. Allemansrätten 
as a legal construct connotes a reasonable and limited access to nature, under terms and 
conditions, and has never been of such legal character that it encroaches on the underlying 
ownership of e.g. the land. The limitations to allemansrätten are often described in the 
following manner: the public may roam in the woods but may never enter the fenced off 
private garden or the family home on the same land. The public may thus dwell in nature 
but this comes with the obligation not to disturb private life, not to litter or damage the 
land, nature, animals or crops.
The phenomenon that we call the commons is a complex concept and not always directly 
connected to e.g. rights to access or rights to roam such as the allemansrätten legal principle. 
Instead, the notion of the commons is presented as a concept used to describe one of 
many categories of co-ownership, of resource distribution, allocation and management. It 
is often connected to a space or a realm where resources are co-owned, held and managed 
in common. In recent research it has been shown that such a space must not necessarily 
3 This principle also exists in various forms in the other Scandinavian jurisdictions, e.g. in Nor-
way where it is called “allemannsrett” and codified in the Norwegian Outdoor Recreation Act 
(Friluftsloven). A similar principle exits in Finish customary law, “jokamiehenoikeus”, but while 
it is not directly codified it is mentioned in the Finish Nature Conservation Act (Luonnonsuo-
jelulaki) and Criminal Code (Rikoslaki).
4 It can be compared to the Anglo-Saxon ”right of way”.
5 Swedish Constitutional Law (Regeringsformen), 2:15. 
6 Mainly in chapters 2 and 7. 
7 While the term “allemansrätten” is not defined in law, initially being a customary legal prin-
ciple, it is usually interpreted in the following manner: Short-term stay usually means a 24 
hours stay. The public is allowed to pick berries, flowers, mushrooms, cycle, hike, swim, etc. 
The public may not do any harm to the nature, land, crops, animals, and so on. The public 
may not disturb the private residences. 
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be a physical space. As such, the concept of commons is typically nowadays divided in 
two – the natural commons which consists of nature and the resources in nature such as 
land, water, air; and the human or cultural commons which consists of the man-made, 
intellectual and cultural resources and comprises broadly of language, knowledge, ideas, 
images, rites, expressions, styles, beliefs, etc. (Hardt 2010. See also (eds.) Bertacchini, 
Bravo, Marrelli & Santagata 2012). Thus, there are (at least) two types of commons: the 
natural commons and the human made, cultural commons. Within the second type of 
commons, namely the cultural, we find the aesthetic expressions, cultural heritage and 
works of art. 
In economic terms the commons is often presented within a “prisoner’s dilemma” setting, 
that is, as a paradox where property that is somehow managed in common also produces 
free riders and as a consequence may result in an over-use and eventual peril of the 
underlying resources, depreciation of value, and that it therefore can undermine individual 
ownership rights. This tendency can lead to the so-called tragedy of the commons. 8 This is 
part of a larger argument that makes the claim that resources will always be best managed 
in private, by virtue of the incentives bestowed on the individual owner by the private 
property rights as a legal and economical construction. Elinor Ostrom, the Nobel laureate 
in Economy, managed to show in her pioneering work Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, (Ostrom 1991) how this is not necessarily 
always the case and how the concept of the commons as a tool, on the contrary, can mean 
an optimal management of resources, particularly when it comes finite resources in nature 
(see also Lessig 2001: 94).
UNESCO divides world heritage in two categories: natural and cultural. If natural 
heritage is envisioned as a natural commons that partly can be governed by such a legal 
principle as the various forms of the Scandinavian allemansrätten it warrants the question 
whether this rationality can be transposed to the cultural landscapes? It can be discussed 
whether the same type of legal reasoning could also govern the cultural commons that 
8 In the much discussed and nowadays legendary essay by Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Com-
mons’ (Hardin 2009, [1968]) he envisions a pasture, where animals graze, that is open to all 
shepherds. Such an open pasture eventually prompts the egotistic shepherds to overpopu-
late it and overuse it, Hardin argues. The egoistic shepherds will be driven by the unlimited 
access to the pasture that will benefit them. This will in turn lead to overgrazing of the 
pasture, which in its turn will result in the destruction of an otherwise fertile land. Hardin 
thus concludes in a much-quoted passage: “Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin 
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a soci-
ety that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” 
(Hardin 2009:246).
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comprises of the common cultural heritage that is (constantly being) created by the 
human intellect, knowledge, skill and ingenuity and resources connected to it such as 
cultural expressions and works of art. In order to provide an answer to this question we 
must now start talking about the legal concept of the cultural commons more seriously 
and ask whether a cultural allemansrätten can be conceived of legally. And could it, as with 
its natural counterpart, be inscribed in law, even constitutional law? 
I propose that it is possible, provided that some dogmatic legal constructions and 
principles are reimagined in order to reach beyond certain obstacles that have so far 
hindered the construction of the legal cultural commons. Such obstacles are for instance 
the (false?) dichotomies  e.g. the notion of the public and the private as opposites, or that 
ownership of cultural works can either be governed by a legal concept that is conceptually 
closed (e.g. individual intellectual property rights) or open (i.e. a reduction or removal of 
the intellectual property rights for the benefit of for instance freedom of expression, free 
open access, and so on). 
Particularly in the Scandinavian legal traditions, we are quite accustomed to legal 
constellations such as allemansrätten as a right to access. Furthermore, the Swedish 
Environmental Code is based on principles and conceptions that are able to handle 
various seemingly different interests simultaneously (e.g. conservation of nature and 
the biospheres, as well as the interests of the land owners, the state, the public, future 
generations), in an economically and democratically sustainable manner. Could the same 
be done for the cultural environment? 
It can be argued that today the natural and cultural resources can be equated. The public 
has a claim on the right to access both the natural and the cultural commons, a claim on 
both the natural and cultural spheres; a claim on equitable access to vital resources needed 
in order to feel well, partake in the democratic community, and simply lead a (perhaps 
Aristotelian?) good life. As opposed to the natural resources, the cultural resources are 
not, necessarily, dwindling. It means that at least Ostrom’s conclusions can possibly be 
transferred to the cultural sphere (see also Hess & Ostrom 2007). I propose that a concept 
of the cultural commons, inscribed in law, does not have to presuppose the removal of 
entitlements, or the restriction of individual rights as intellectual property rights. On the 
contrary, it has to do with conceiving of an economically, culturally and democratically 
sustainable management of the cultural commons that comprises of cultural resources and 
cultural heritage, and that takes into consideration all types of interests (owners, users, 
state, public, future generations and so on). Such a legal concept, based on the constellation 
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of a number of interests, can be envisioned by employing the rhizome theory developed 
by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and discussing a rhizomatic jurisprudence.
Rhizomatic jurisprudence – resolving the dichotomies
Gilles Deleuze wrote several books on art (Deleuze 2003; Deleuze 2009, Deleuze 2010, 
etc.). And a lot has been written on the subject of Gilles Deleuze and art (e.g. Sauvagnargues 
& Bankston, 2013). Perhaps an equally vast amount of studies have been conducted on 
the topic of jurisprudence and art (e.g. Douzinas & Nead 1999, Ben-Dor 2011). In 
recent research various interesting connections have even been made between Deleuzian 
philosophy and jurisprudence (Bruncevic 2014; de Sutter & McGee (eds.) 2012; Mussawir 
2011a; Mussawir 2011b; Lefebvre 2009; Braidotti, Colebrook & Hanafin (eds.) 2009; 
Lefebvre 2007; Moore 2007; Lefebvre 2006; Lefebvre 2005; Moore 2004, Moore 2000). 
In Fixing the Shadows (Bruncevic 2014). I discuss how a Deleuzeoguattarian approach 
to jurisprudence can further enable access to art by envisioning and constructing a legal 
concept of the cultural commons. Some main arguments of that study are presented here. 
Gilles Deleuze is one of the twentieth century’s most important thinkers (if we are to take 
Michel Foucault’s word for it). Together with Félix Guattari, he developed the concept 
of the “rhizome” (le rhizome) in their influential work A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari 2011). As a philosophical tool the rhizome is 
complex to outline by its very nature. The rhizome can be described as a concept that 
promotes connectivity, heterogeneity and multiplicity. The concept challenges cognitive 
hierarchical systems and binary reasoning. It describes alternative modes of organisation 
that are not dependent on, either metaphorical or actual, vertical hierarchies, that 
produce binary opposites that lock reasoning into paradoxes. Such vertical hierarchies are 
usually opposite-based, and can give rise to a steady decrease of possible alternatives in 
philosophy, or I as am exploring here, in jurisprudence. 
The critique of systems and vertical hierarchies in legal philosophy is certainly nothing 
new or unfamiliar to the researchers in the realms of critical or alternative jurisprudence 
(Douzinas 2014). What the rhizomatic approach adds to the critical jurisprudence is a 
methodological possibility of providing both the critical as well as, in Deleuzian manner 
of speaking, the clinical (Deleuze 1998) i.e. the possibility of revealing the potential 
of law and conceiving of alternative jurisprudential concepts and tools. The particular 
theoretical tools that the notions of connectivity, heterogeneity and multiplicity produce 
enable the conception of such a legal concept as the cultural commons, a constellation 
concept that connects the private and the public, the open and the closed, the ownership 
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and the access. The rhizomatic approach allows the or to be turned into a performative 
and with the application of the Deleuzeoguattarian theory:
“A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between 
things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome 
is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and... and... and...’” (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2011: 27). 
The paradox of access to art has so far been this: artworks are legally conceived of as either 
privately closed off though e.g. intellectual property law and where access is granted case-
by-case, often in a commercial manner. In such a case one or several individuals own 
the artwork and the person who can afford access is the one who is granted access: the 
artwork is seen as a commodity. Or the artwork is legally conceived as completely open, 
as a free expression or as part of the public domain, and as such it is un-owned or owned 
by everybody. In the cases where artworks are legally constructed as fully open or in the 
public domain the incentive to create and exploit one’s intellectual works diminishes as 
this approach restricts or removes the individual ownership right, and this can lead to 
fewer works, less diversity and ipso facto become a cultural tragedy of the commons. The 
rhizome theory provides an alternative to this conundrum. 
The core idea of the rhizome theory in law may be that it appears to be able to transcend 
these, admittedly false, dichotomies between e.g. public and private, open and closed, 
as it is stressing not the hostile opposites, but rather interlinkage, the and... and... and... 
(Deleuze&Guattari 2011: 27) and the potential of constructing legal concepts based on 
alliances rather than oppositions. Which means that a cultural commons as a concept can 
be formulated legally, with e.g. some inspiration from the Scandinavian allemansrätten. In 
this manner, as we shall see shortly, the principles of the rhizome do not dissolve but rather 
resolve the dichotomies so that a constellation based concept can be formulated legally, 
one that can tend to several different interests at the same time.
Therefore, jurisprudence may have rhizomatic qualities. The concept of allemansrätten is 
a prefect example of the rhizomatics of law, where the idea of the public and the private 
can co-exist and not necessarily form a hostile opposite. The concept of the cultural 
commons can thus be moved away from the prisoner’s dilemma setting, from the tragedy 
of the commons, from being understood as paradoxical in terms of the private and public, 
or as only belonging to the extra-legal, political, sociological, or economical realms. The 
rhizome theory attracts legal attention as it disrupts the need for a distinction between 
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an inside and an outside of law, of describing public and private as each other’s opposites, 
and it provides a legal alternative beyond the notion of ownership and access as each 
other’s antitheses.
The cultural commons and the Deleuzeoguattarian forms of possession 
The models of possession developed by Deleuze and Guattari, within the setting of the 
rhizomatic theory, can potentially handle a concept that is a constellation of private and 
public. These two models of possession are the sedentary model and the nomadic model 
respectively. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish the two forms of possession by claiming 
that the first is territorialised (i.e. within a known economical form of production and 
within a territorially defined legal order) and that the second is deterritorialised (i.e. the 
one that emerges from new modes of production, with e.g. new technology, new laws, new 
forms of management, the one that cannot instantly be recognised by any one readymade 
economical or legal principle only). The sedentary model is for instance dependent of 
stable forms of regulation, of defined territories and jurisdictions. This sedentary model 
presupposes enclosure or exclusivity; in order to possess material property the object has 
to be enclosed and governed by individual property rights. If the object of possession is 
immaterial it has to be enclosed conceptually by e.g. individual rights and exclusivity 
principles, for instance intellectual property law. Contrary to the focus on enclosure 
and exclusivity that are both tightly connected to the sedentary model, the nomadic 
model does not imply any such exclusion or stable territory-based possession (Mussawir 
2011:107). Under the nomadic model, Mussawir writes, “possession implies a different 
kind of relation that cannot sustain any of these elements of establishment, exclusion and lack. 
Since possession does not imply division, exclusions or stable territory, [it] requires other 
factors altogether” (Mussawir 2011:107). 
The sedentary form of possession is dependent on the possibility to divide and exclude 
– it requires a striated space, a territorialised legal order. The nomadic form of possession 
challenges the notions of division, exclusivity, territoriality and enclosure, it is a smooth 
space, not (yet) territorialised by the legal order. However, when Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss the nomadic forms of possession they do not present it as the opposite of the 
sedentary form. They write:
“[W]e must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in 
mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into 
striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to 
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smooth space [….] and the two can happen simultaneously.” (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2011: 524)
It is this very continuity, the constant movement from one form to another, the unfinished 
transitions from the one form to the other, that must be understood and it is imperative 
that it be kept in mind when discussing the concept of the commons (natural as well 
as cultural). The concept of the (again, natural as well as cultural) commons can never 
be approached as a static, or striated, legal concept or form of possession. The concept 
of the commons must be understood as a deterritorialising, nomadic legal form of 
possession. However hard we might try, it is still for instance very difficult to territorially 
govern or enclose digital and dematerialised, cultural forms of expressions. Within the 
Deleuzeoguattarian theory, possession cannot be equated to ‘ownership’ either, at least 
not ‘ownership’ as we have come to know it. Rather, the modes of possession indicate that 
to possess does not necessarily equate ‘to own’. As Leif Dahlberg argues with reference to 
digital media content and Roman Law:
“[T]he concept of property is complex, and possession (possessio, occupatio, 
usucapio, or detentio), for example, does not automatically or necessarily 
lead to an exclusive and absolute ownership (dominium). Whereas in 
ancient Rome this distinction between possession and ownership generally 
applied to property in land, today it also bears on the ways in which media 
users may use the digital media content they have acquired or purchased.” 
(Dahlberg 2011:264) 
The concept of the cultural commons may appear to be as a ‘the opposite of private’ or as 
an equal to ‘public’ form of possession. But it is not. It is a moving, iterant nomadic form 
of possession. When Lawrence Lessig for instance comments on the cultural commons 
he claims the key issue is that commons are producing something of value. This value 
can be a resource e.g. in terms of decentralised or open innovation (Lessig 2001: 85). He 
argues further:
“[Commons] create the opportunity for individuals to draw upon 
resources without connections, permission, or access granted by others. 
They are environments that commit themselves to being open. Individuals 
and corporations draw upon the value created by this openness. They 
transform that value into other value, which they then consume privately.” 
(Lessig 2011:85)
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An environment in which the open access and the private exploitation and consumption 
do not cancel each other out is precisely the rhizomatic quality of the Deleuzeoguattarian 
forms of possession that we need, one that opens the theoretical possibility of envisioning 
and formulating a legal concept where the two can be connected instead of presented as a 
false dichotomy. As such, it does not dissolve the dichotomies such as private and public, 
they remain separate. However, it resolves them, from being antagonistic opposite-based 
pairings, instead becoming an alliance in a rhizomatic concept within the nomadic form 
of possession. 
A legal concept of the cultural commons as a “cultural allemansrätt” – a 
possibility 
As we saw above, allemansrätten in nature comes with responsibilities in terms of the 
privacy and ownership; and the person who is given the right to access nature is also 
simultaneously given an obligation not to harm, disturb, litter, nor to damage the land, its 
resources, biospheres, the animals or the crops. When we finally arrive at allemansrätten in 
culture, it too must come with similar set of limitations, obligations and responsibilities, 
i.e. to not harm the underlying individual ownership right and the resources connected 
to it. A right that allows the public to, during a short term and under certain conditions, 
legally access the cultural landscapes and, current and future as well as older or even 
ancient, cultural heritage. This can be done through a legal constellation that focuses on 
sustainability of cultural heritage, both the heritage that has existed for centuries as well as 
the one that is coming into existence now and that is constantly being produced.
The rhizomatic approach to legal reasoning opens up the possibility to conceive of such 
concepts that can handle the public and the private together as an alliance in law. The 
sedentary and nomadic forms of possession indicate that there is a sliding scale between 
ownership, possession and access, and this can be upheld and recognised legally in a 
concept of cultural commons. 
Enabling access to artworks through a legal concept of the cultural commons works thus 
in conjunction with current intellectual property and other private ownership laws. A lot 
of inspiration can be drawn from the institutions that are already somehow managed 
and governed as cultural commons such as our museums, libraries, archives, open access 
platforms, commons initiatives... They also show us that principles of free public access 
do not necessarily preclude profit.
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Access to art through a cultural commons is the equivalent of the hiking, camping and 
the picking of berries in the cultural environment. The notion of “environment” is also 
what further enables the connection with the natural commons and allemansrätten 
to be made even more comfortably. It has to do with the public’s cultural health and 
wellbeing. It certainly has to do with democracy. This approach is both an economically 
and democratically sustainable management of our common cultural resources.
The rationale of this article has been this, to present some musings on the possibilities 
in terms of rights to access that can be inscribed in law through a legal concept of the 
cultural commons. This potential is already there in many of our legal orders. I have 
presented allemansrätten as one such example. UNESCOs regulation of world heritage 
may be another. A commons-based access, as has been argued here, is capable of handling 
the private and the public simultaneously.
In critical legal studies the constructivist approaches to legal concepts are sometimes 
frowned upon, the critical is often favoured over the clinical. The Deleuzeoguattarian 
approach to legal philosophy allows for an alliance between the critical and the clinical. 
This is one among many connections that is enabled by the rhizomatic approach. This is 
rhizomatic jurisprudence. But the clinical presented here is only the beginning of this on-
going approach. The next step is to go ahead and construct the legal concept of the cultural 
commons, one that can handle access to current as well as to ancient cultural heritage. 
It could maybe be formulated as the “cultural allemansrätten”, or as a principle that is 
inscribed in the national laws of Europe? Or maybe as an EU directive? Or maybe… To 
achieve that, we have to acknowledge the possibilities of law and we now not only need 
to, we have to, talk about the legal concept of the cultural commons.
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